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A collective-risk social dilemma implies that personal endowments will be lost if contributions to the common
pool within a group are too small. Failure to reach the collective target thus has dire consequences for all group
members, independently of their strategies. Wanting to move away from unfavorable locations is therefore
all but surprising. Inspired by these observations, we here propose and study a collective-risk social dilemma
where players are allowed to move if the collective failure becomes too probable. More precisely, this so-called
risk-driven migration is launched depending on the difference between the actual contributions and the declared
target. Mobility therefore becomes an inherent property that is utilized in an entirely self-organizing manner.
We show that under these assumptions cooperation is promoted much more effectively than under the action of
manually determined migration rates. For the latter, we in fact identify parameter regions where the evolution of
cooperation is incredibly inhibited. Moreover, we find unexpected spatial patterns where cooperators that do not
form compact clusters outperform those that do, and where defectors are able to utilize strikingly different ways
of invasion. The presented results support the recently revealed importance of percolation for the successful
evolution of public cooperation, while at the same time revealing surprisingly simple ways of self-organization
towards socially desirable states.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 89.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
Our remarkable other-regarding abilities are believed to
have evolved because alone we would have difficulties rear-
ing offspring that survived [1]. Between-group conflicts are
also cited frequently to that effect [2]. Although today the
main challenges appear to be different, cooperation and in-
group solidarity are still very much desired and indeed ur-
gently needed behavioral traits [3]. Where it not for them,
the preservation of natural resources for future generations,
the provisioning of health and social care, as well as many
other amenities we have come to take for granted, would be
greatly challenged. The “tragedy of the commons” [4] can
only be averted if we manage to withstand the temptations of
free-riding on the efforts of others, and if we succeed in fully
realizing the global long-term implications of our shortsighted
behavior that is aimed only at maximizing our current wellbe-
ing [5]. History teaches us that this is a formidable ask, mainly
because it goes against our natural instincts.
Theoretical insights on the subject are to a large extent due
to evolutionary game theory [6, 7], which has proven times
and again as a very competent framework for the study of the
evolution of cooperation [8]. Different branches of science,
ranging from biology, sociology and economics to mathemat-
ics and physics, converge on this particular problem, as evi-
denced by reviews that comprehensively describe recent ad-
vances [9–14]. The public goods game, in particular, is fre-
quently considered as the paradigm that succinctly captures
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the essential social dilemma that emerges as a consequence of
group and individual interests being inherently different [15].
Governed by group interactions, the public goods game re-
quires that players decide simultaneously whether they wish
to contribute to the common pool or not. Regardless of the
chosen strategy, each member of the group receives an equal
share of the public good after the initial investments are mul-
tiplied by a synergy factor that takes into account the added
value of collaborative efforts. In generally framed in coevo-
lutionary models [14, 16], recent research on the spatial pub-
lic goods game [17] highlighted appropriate partner selection
[18, 19], diversity [20–23], the critical mass [24], heteroge-
neous wealth distributions [25], the introduction of punish-
ment [26–28] and reward [29], network modularity [30], co-
ordinated investments [31] and conditional strategies [32], or
the joker effect [33] as viable to promote the evolution of pub-
lic cooperation.
Although deceptively similar to the public goods game, the
collective-risk social dilemma captures more vividly an addi-
tional important feature of “problems of the commons” [34],
which is that failure to reach a declared global target can have
severe long-term consequences. Opting out of carbon emis-
sion reduction to harvest short-term economic benefits is a
typical example. The blueprint of the game is as follows. All
players are considered to have an initial endowment, and co-
operation means contributing a fraction of it to the common
pool. Defectors do not contribute. The risk level is deter-
mined by a collective target that should be reached with in-
dividual investments. If a group fails to reach this target, all
members of the group loose their remaining endowments with
a certain probability, while otherwise the endowments are re-
tained. Most importantly, the risk of collective failures has
been identified as a potent promoter of responsible social be-
havior [34–38]. Here we employ the collective-risk social
2dilemma, where the risk is a dynamically changing group-
performance-dependent quantity, which can be fine-tuned by
a single parameter β that interpolates between a step-like and
a flat risk function.
Considering structured populations, as pioneered by Nowak
and May [39], also invites mobility as an inherent property of
players that adds another layer of reality to the study. Clearly
attesting to this fact is the overwhelming attention mobility
has received, both in games governed by pairwise [40–54] as
well as, although to a much lesser extent, in games governed
by group interactions [55–57]. Indeed, being free and mobile
is one of the hallmarks of modern societies. However, fam-
ily and friend ties, traveling and adaptation costs, as well as
all the other difficulties that can be associated with migration
act as strong inhibitors of changing location. Here we take this
into account by introducing and studying so-called risk-driven
migration. The main premise lies in the assumption that we
are forced to migrate by the immediate (possibly unfavorable)
environment rather than this being the consequence of our ex-
plicit desire to do so. As noted, the risk depends on the differ-
ence between the actual contributions and the declared target
in each group, which changes dynamically as do the spatial
patterns. Players are aware of this risk, and they are more
likely to move the higher the risk. This is significantly differ-
ent from previous studies, where for example success-driven
migration [46] or identical migration rates for all players were
assumed [41, 43]. In our case migration is a self-organizing
process that depends only on the risk each individual is ex-
posed to. It thus does not require additional parameters, nor
does it require additional cognitive skills that would be needed
by players to estimate the income at potential new locations.
As we will show in what follows, this self-organizing risk-
driven migration outperforms previous migratory actions, and
it leads to spatial patterns that enable cooperators to optimally
exploit their mutually beneficial behavior. Before presenting
the main results, however, we proceed with the details of the
model in the next section.
II. MODEL
We consider the collective-risk social dilemma on a square
lattice of size L×L with periodic boundary conditions. Each
site can either be empty or occupied by a cooperator or defec-
tor. The fraction of occupied sites constitutes the population
density ρ (0 < ρ ≤ 1), which is kept constant during the
evolutionary process. Initially thus a joint total of ρL2 coop-
erators and defectors populate the lattice uniformly at random
with equal probability, and each of them is granted an initial
endowment b.
We employ asynchronous updating, such that a randomly
selected player x plays the collective-risk social dilemma
game with its eight nearest neighbors (if present), and thereby
collects its total payoff Px. Cooperators contribute an amount
c from the endowment to the public good, whereas defectors
contribute nothing. Due to the vacant sites there is an obvi-
ous possibility for a different number of players participating
in each collective-risk social dilemma. The collective target
for each group is therefore defined with this in mind, such
that T = nα, where n is the number of active players and α
(0 ≤ α ≤ 1) is the weighting factor that determines the col-
lective threshold. If the total amount of collected contributions
within a group Gi is either reached or surpassed, each player
can keep what it has not yet contributed into the common pool.
In the opposite case, if the collective target is not reached,
all group members loose their remaining endowments with a
probability ri. The corresponding risk probability in a group
is calculated according to
ri =
{
(T−nc
T
)β if nc < T,
0 if nc ≥ T,
(1)
where nc is the number of cooperators in the group, while β
is a tunable parameter determining the nonlinearity of the risk
function. For β = 0 the risk function is step-like, which was
most frequently considered in previous works. For β = 1, on
the other hand, the risk function is linearly proportional to the
difference between the collective target and the collected con-
tributions. Evidently, β can also be larger than one, although
in this case the collective risk is so small that the evolution of
cooperation is strongly inhibited. We therefore focus on the
unit interval of β.
Following the accumulation of the payoff, player x moves
to a randomly chosen empty site (if it exists) within its Moore
neighborhood with the probability rm = Σiri/n, which sim-
ply quantifies the average risk the player experiences by being
in its current location. If there are no empty sites within the
Moore neighborhood player x does not move. On the other
hand, to avoid long periods of isolation, players with no neigh-
bors must make a mandatory move, although this is a techni-
cal detail that does not notably influence the outcome of the
game. At this point we emphasize again that this simple defi-
nition of mobility introduces no additional parameters, it does
not assume special cognitive skills of the players, and it can-
not be subject to different mobility time-scale investigations.
Interaction of time scales are known to play an important role
in evolutionary dynamics [58–60], yet in our case the propen-
sity to move can vary significantly from player to player, and
of course it varies also over time. It is in fact a self-organizing
rather than a manually adjusted process, and as we will show,
performs superior even under the most adverse conditions.
Lastly then, player x adopts the strategy of a randomly cho-
sen neighbor y with a probability
f(Py − Px) =
1
1 + exp[−(Py − Px)/κ]
, (2)
where κ denotes the amplitude of noise [11]. Taking into ac-
count the insight of [17], we set κ = 0.5, which implies that
better performing strategies will very likely spread, yet it is
not impossible for a strategy performing worse to spread ei-
ther. It is worth pointing out that the results reported below
remain qualitative identical if the best-takes-over rule [39] is
used for strategy updating.
Results reported in the next section have been obtained by
means of Monte Carlo simulations, which were carried out
using L = 50 and 100 different initial conditions (the same
3FIG. 1: (Color online) Fraction of cooperators as a function of the
donation ratio c/b for a fixed value of β = 0.5 and different values
of α in (a), and for a fixed value of α = 0.7 and different values of
β in (b). In both panels the density of players is ρ = 0.5.
results can of course also be obtained if using larger lattices).
As is standard practice, during one full Monte Carlo step, all
individuals will have received a chance once on average to
learn a new strategy from one of their neighbors.
III. RESULTS
Figure 1(a) shows the fraction of cooperators at equilib-
rium as a function of the donation ratio c/b at β = 0.5 and
ρ = 0.5 for five different values of α. It can be observed that
for each value of α the fraction of cooperators decreases with
increasing c/b. In addition, for some intermediate c/b val-
ues the fraction of cooperators increases with increasing α. In
Fig. 1(b) we show the fraction of cooperators as a function of
the donation ratio c/b for a fixed value of α = 0.7 and five
different values of β. It can be observed that for each value
of β the fraction of cooperators decreases with increasing c/b.
At some intermediate c/b values, however, the fraction of co-
operators decreases with increasing β.
In order to explore the effects of α and β more precisely, we
show in Fig. 2 the fraction of cooperators in dependence on α
and β together for three different values of c/b. We see that for
small c/b (for example c/b = 0.1) the fraction of cooperators
is zero when α is zero, regardless of the value of β. In fact, in
this case there is no collective-risk, and our model is identical
to the traditional public goods game. Correspondingly, defec-
tors can have a higher payoff as long as c/b > 0, and thus
cooperators cannot survive. However, in other parameter re-
gions full cooperation can be achieved, even for small α > 0
or large β [Fig. 2(a)]. When the donation ratio becomes larger
(for example c/b = 0.3), cooperators cannot survive for small
α [Fig. 2(b)]. However, full cooperation can still be achieved
for large α, although the region shrinks. As c/b continues to
increase (for example c/b = 0.5), cooperators can only sur-
vive for large α and small β. For still larger c/b, full defection
is obtained irrespective of α and β (not shown here).
From this it follows that, since for small α the risk of col-
lective failure is small, cooperators do not have a higher pay-
off than the neighboring defectors, especially for higher c/b.
In addition, individuals are easily satisfied with their current
positions, and accordingly they do not move. In this situa-
tion, cooperators are easily exploited by defectors and are in-
deed wiped out relatively fast. But as α increases, the risk of
collective failure is increases as well. Consequently, there is
thus a higher probability that cooperators will have a similar
payoff as the surrounding defectors. At the same time, the
migration becomes much more probable, so that interactions
between cooperators and defectors become less frequent. The
effectiveness at which defectors exploit cooperators therefore
becomes smaller, and accordingly, the successful evolution of
public cooperation is likelier.
When α is larger, the randomly selected defectors are more
frequently dissatisfied with their current sites than their neigh-
boring cooperators, especially when they encounter other de-
fectors. Thus, clusters of defectors easily collapse in this
model because a higher fraction of them changes their posi-
tion during one Monte Carlo step. However, when β is small,
a tiny fraction of selected cooperators will move at the be-
ginning of the evolutionary process. These cooperators are
therefore able form small yet supporting clusters after the de-
fectors depart, and they can in fact resist the invasion. More
to the point, cooperators can use the safe haven of aggregated
clusters to invade mobile defectors, ultimately resulting in an
increasing cooperation density. In agreement with this argu-
ment defectors begin moving even more frequently, yet also
less steadily. In the final stages of the evolutionary process
migrations seize and the cooperators begin dominating the
whole population. When β becomes larger, a high fraction
of randomly selected defectors still changes their locations,
and quite surprisingly some of the selected cooperators also
move to nearby empty sites. This indicates that, under such
circumstances, cooperators cannot form effective clusters as
easily as they have done before. In fact, even if some clusters
succeed in forming, the mobile defectors can destroy them ef-
fectively. As we will elaborate later, such conditions enable a
dynamical equilibrium between cooperators and defectors.
To demonstrate the leading mechanisms that determine pat-
tern formation at different α− β pairs, we present representa-
tive sequences of snapshots, as obtained from prepared initial
states depicted in Figs. 3(a) and (f). Here, as a starting config-
uration, we begin with three domains in which the strategies
are either pure C or D (the two bottom islands) or the mixture
of these two strategies (the single upper island). To clarify the
importance of the collective risk, we have applied two differ-
ent colors for each strategy in order to mark the success of the
group surrounding the focal player. More precisely, we mark
by blue (green) a cooperator whose central group succeeds
(fails) to reach the collective target. Similarly, red (yellow)
are defectors in the center of a successful low risk (unsuccess-
ful high risk) group.
Figure 3 shows the evolution at the same β = 0.2 value but
two different α values. At the low α = 0.2 value [panels from
(a) to (e)], the rare presence of cooperators is already able to
ensure the group to avoid the risk. As Fig. 3(a) shows, blue
and red colors are present in the mixed domains, signaling
that both strategies are in successful groups here. As a results,
defectors can exploit their advantage by keeping their endow-
ments and become a more successful strategy. The success of
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Fraction of cooperators in dependence on α and β in a contour plot form for three different donation ratios: (a)
c/b = 0.1, (b) c/b = 0.3 and (c) c/b = 0.5. In all three panels the density of players is ρ = 0.3.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Pattern formation as observed from a prepared initial at β = 0.2. The weighting factor related to collective threshold
is α = 0.2 [upper row from (a) to (e)] and α = 0.9 [bottom row from (f) to (j)]. Cooperators whose focal group succeeds (fails) to reach
the collective target are denoted blue (green). Similarly, defectors whose focal group succeeds (fails) are denoted red (yellow). White marks
empty sites. Other parameters are: ρ = 0.30, c/b = 0.5 and L = 60. Monte Carlo steps are t = 0, 3, 25, 40, 90 for panels (a) to (e), and
t = 0, 18, 30, 53, 465 for panels (f) to (j), respectively.
defectors will easily drive the community into the tragedy of
the commons, which is indicated by the emergence of yellow
color here. Figure 3(b) demonstrates that only those defectors
remain successful who are in the vicinity of cooperators (red
is only present in the neighborhood of blue or green). Mean-
while, the initially full D island decomposes since the failure
of their groups triggers an intensive migration among these
players. When a D player reaches the bulk of the cooperative
island, as shown in Fig. 3(c), it becomes successful and can
easily invade the cooperative domain. Naturally, the initially
more successful defectors become unsuccessful due to the im-
itation behind the propagation front, as illustrated in Fig. 3(d).
It is also worth mentioning that this front can only move along
one direction because cooperators may imitate the more suc-
cessful (red) defectors but the reversed red to blue or yellow
to red transitions are not possible. Finally D prevail and dis-
tribute homogeneously due to the permanent migration that
originates from their dissatisfaction (constant involvement in
high-risk groups).
Keeping the same β but choosing a higher α = 0.9 value,
a significantly different evolution can be observed, as illus-
trated in Figs. 3(f)-(j). Because of the higher threshold, even
the identical initial state is interpreted differently, as shown
by different colors in the mixed C + D domain in Fig. 3(f).
Here, the rare presence of cooperators cannot ensure groups
to avoid the risk, and hence both strategies are initially stuck
in “unsuccessful” groups, as evidence by the application of
green and yellow color. Because of the high risk both strate-
gies gain nothing, and hence they are neutral. The initial
coarsening thus proceeds according to the voter-model-type
dynamics [61]. Due to domain growth, when the local density
of cooperators reaches the necessary critical level as deter-
mined by the α value, cooperators become successful [turn-
ing blue in Fig. 3(g)], which yields a higher payoff for them.
Consequently, they start invading the mixed domain, as shown
in Fig. 3(h), because their diluted distribution provides a ro-
bust and effective formation against defection. It is important
to note that cooperators can become “successful” first at the
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Pattern formation as observed from a prepared initial at α = 0.8. The risk probability parameter is β = 0.6 [upper
row from (a) to (e)] and β = 0.1 [bottom row from (f) to (j)]. Cooperators whose focal group succeeds (fails) to reach the collective target
are denoted blue (green). Similarly, defectors whose focal group succeeds (fails) are denoted red (yellow). White marks empty sites. Other
parameters are: ρ = 0.30, c/b = 0.5 and L = 60. Monte Carlo steps are t = 0, 3, 21, 40, 120 for panels (a) to (e), and t = 0, 8, 40, 85, 380
for panels (f) to (j), respectively.
edge of the mixed domain, where the absence of defectors al-
lows them to change their status more easily. This observation
helps to understand why the diluted population of cooperators
(rather than a compact cluster) is capable to elevate the co-
operation level, which will elaborate on later. As can be ob-
served from in Fig. 3(i), the above mentioned diluted distribu-
tion of cooperators can invade the full D domains, ultimately
resulting in the total victory of cooperation. The final state,
plotted in Fig. 3(j), also illustrates that the very high thresh-
old makes the compact C domain robust against the attack of
drifting defectors. The latter fail to exploit cooperators, and
instead change their strategy upon contact. From this point on-
wards they stop moving, which practically results in a growth
of the cooperative domain, similar to the well-know diffusion-
limited aggregation [62].
The influence of β, which determines the shape of the risk
probability function, is illustrated in Fig. 4, where the same
threshold parameter α = 0.8 was used for both series of snap-
shots. Here we compare the evolution at β = 0.6 [upper row,
from (a) to (e)] and at β = 0.1 [lower row, from (f) to (j)]. For
both initial states plotted in panels (a) and (f), the relatively
high α value results in “unsuccessful” C and D players in the
mixed domain. Accordingly, a random drift of both strate-
gies starts the evolutionary process, similarly as described for
Fig. 3(g). The randomly aggregated cooperators can form the
seed of a successful “blue” domain, but because of the rela-
tively high β value the neighboring defectors will not neces-
sarily fails and might keep their endowments. Consequently,
cooperators cannot utilize the advantage of the high thresh-
old and loose. As always, the pure defector domain falls into
pieces intensively. When a D player reaches the pure C do-
main, as shown in Fig. 4(c), it can invade it entirely and fast.
This invasion, however, is significantly different from the
one previously described for Fig. 3(d). In the present case
FIG. 5: (Color online) Representative snapshot of a stationary mixed
phase, as obtained for α = 0.4, β = 0.9, c/b = 0.3 and ρ = 0.30.
The color code is identical to the one used in Figs. 3 and 4.
defectors cannot be focal players of a successful group be-
cause of the high α but, on the other hand, can avoid the risk
(due to large value of β) and are capable to lower the pay-
off of “green” cooperators who are located at the frontier of
the full C domain. Consequently, the weakened C will adopt
the D strategy, and hence shift the invasion front further. In
contrast to the previously mentioned front propagation, the
present movement can be reversed, which depends sensitively
on the β value. The final state, plotted in Fig. 4(e), is a ran-
domly distributed full D state.
If using the same threshold but at lower β value, as plot-
ted in Figs. 4(f) to (j), the outcome is rather different. As
panel (g) shows, C players can aggregate randomly again to
become “successful”. Temporarily even D players can man-
6FIG. 6: (Color online) Fraction of cooperators as a function of the
population density ρ for a fixed value of β = 0.5 and three different
values of α in (a), and for a fixed value of α = 0.4 and three different
values of β in (b).
age to be central players of a successful group, yet the low
β = 0.1 will result in a high risk probability for defectors
who cannot spread. Instead, as panels (h) and (i) illustrate, the
rare distribution of C players prevails again. This effective
formation spreads from the edge to the center of the mixed
domain as mentioned earlier. Meanwhile, when a drifting de-
fector reaches the compact C domain, as shown in Fig. 4(h),
a different type of invasion can be observed. Since the thresh-
old is not extremely high, a defector who is surrounded by
cooperators can collect competitive payoff which is neces-
sary to intrude the pure C phase. Behind the invasion front
a mixed phase emerges, as shown in Fig. 4(i). This mixture
of “unsuccessful” cooperators and defectors is an excellent
target to invade by the rare distribution of cooperators, as we
have already described for the initially mixed domain. In other
words, compactly clustered cooperators will loose the battle,
but the evolutionary process will ultimately be won by diluted
cooperators later.
In the above discussed cases the final state was always a
full D or a full C phase. There are, however, parameter values
where the stationary state is a mixture of both strategies. Here,
as Fig. 5 illustrates, the diluted cooperators compete with tem-
porarily aggregated defectors. At the edge of these fronts ei-
ther rare, and hence successful defectors invade, or dense, and
therefore unsuccessful defectors are invaded, finally resulting
in a dynamical balance of the competing spatial patterns and
the stable coexistence of the two strategies.
In what follows, it remains of interest to show how the pop-
ulation density ρ influences the evolution of cooperation. Fig-
ure 6 presents the main results to that effect. It can be ob-
served that the fraction of cooperators first sharply increases
and then decreases while the population density is increased.
As we have discovered recently, low population densities can
be extremely useful for the successful evolution of cooper-
ation [63]. Here we confirm this, although by means of a
self-organizing process, discovering that a full C phase can
be obtained for sufficiently small population densities for dif-
ferent values of α [Fig. 6(a)] and β [Fig. 6(b)], even for small
α = 0.1 or large β = 0.8. In general, the region of full coop-
eration increases with α and decreases with β. When the pop-
ulation density approaches one, cooperators cannot survive
FIG. 7: (Color online) In panel (a) the fraction of cooperators is pre-
sented as a function of α for a fixed value of β = 0.5 and different
constant migration rates. In panel (b) the fraction of cooperators is
presented as a function of β for a fixed value of α = 0.5 and differ-
ent constant migration rates. The population density is ρ = 0.3 and
c/b = 0.3. Also depicted in both panels are results obtained with
adaptive risk-migration (ARM).
under such adverse conditions. Obviously, the described su-
pereffective diluted formation of cooperators cannot emerge.
Nevertheless, for sufficiently favorable conditions cooperators
can defeat defectors by forming compact clusters. In the other
extreme, when the population density approaches zero, coop-
erators simply cannot form sufficiently large domains, either
diluted or compact, to resist the invasion of defectors. Ac-
cordingly, a sharp rise of defectors is unavoidable, as can be
observed in Fig. 6.
We conclude this section by comparing the efficiency of
the proposed risk-driven migration with other game theoreti-
cal models, where the collective-risk function is still applied
to calculate the payoff but the mobility of players is deter-
mined (and adjusted) manually. More precisely, as an alter-
native model, we apply random migration with a fixed migra-
tion rate for each selected individual and compare the outcome
with that of the original risk-driven migration model. Figure 7
shows clearly that risk-driven migration always performs bet-
ter, independently of the α and β values. The presented results
also evidence clearly that the cooperation level can even be
much lower if a higher fixed migration rate is used, which im-
plies that random mobility with a high fixed migration rate is
very much detrimental for the evolution of public cooperation.
Hence, we conclude that the previous “migration undermines
cooperation” observation [3] can only be valid if the mobility
is randomly motivated and unrelated with the performance of
the group.
IV. SUMMARY
We have proposed and studied risk-driven migration in
the collective-risk social dilemma game on a square lattice.
Since the risk was considered to be a dynamically changing
group-dependent property that is determined by the difference
between the actual contributions and the declared target in
each group, the mobility could be introduced in an elegant
parameter-free manner, subject only to the self-organization
7of players according to their experience of risk on different
locations. Like previous works considering the impact of
mobility on the outcome of games governed by group inter-
actions [56, 57], we have discovered that risk-driven migra-
tion strongly promotes the evolution of public cooperation.
Specifically, the cooperation level increases with the collec-
tive target and decreases with the nonlinear parameter of the
risk function, whereby complete cooperator dominance was
found possible even under extremely adverse conditions. Per-
haps even more importantly, we have revealed counterintuitive
propagation patterns of cooperative behavior that have thus far
not been reported. Quite remarkably, the often cited compact
clusters of cooperators have proven inferior to a diluted spa-
tial configuration of cooperators. While defectors could easily
infiltrate the former, the diluted population was able to defend
itself because upon the invasion of defectors the income in
the group dropped suddenly, so that selfishness was unable to
grab a hold. What is more, this diluted phalanx of cooperators
was able to invade defectors, in turn leading to completely
defector-free states. Obviously, the spontaneous formation of
this supereffective cooperative formation requires some por-
tion of the lattice to be empty. Accordingly, we have found
that there exists an intermediate range of population densi-
ties, at which the mechanism works best. This is strongly in
agreement with recent results obtained on diluted lattices [63],
where the percolation threshold was found close to be optimal
for the evolution of public cooperation. Yet there the condi-
tions were given “manually”, while here they have emerged
spontaneously due to risk-driven migration. Moreover, in pa-
rameter regions where defectors dominated, we have demon-
strated two significantly different invasion possibilities. One
under conditions of abundance where groups were in general
able to meet the declared targets, and the other under condi-
tions of failure, where the presence of defectors rendered the
previously successful cooperators unable to fill the common
pool. We have also revealed that the coexistence of cooper-
ators and defectors is possible only in relatively narrow pa-
rameter regions, where there is a dynamical equilibrium be-
tween the diluted cooperative domains and rare, and there-
fore successful, defectors and aggregated, and therefore un-
successful, defectors. Lastly, we have compared the effective-
ness of risk-driven migration to random migration with fixed
migration rates, and found that for the latter, there exist pa-
rameter regions where the evolution of public cooperation is
in fact incredibly inhibited. Overall, the self-organizing na-
ture of risk-driven migration outperforms manually adjusted
migratory rules by a considerable margin. Our study thus out-
lines how the dynamical perception of risk can guide migra-
tory patterns in an extremely effective manner, such that pub-
lic cooperation benefits significantly more than is expected by
virtue of the traditional “compact cooperative cluster” hypoth-
esis [39].
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